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Abstract 
The prisoners’ dilemma may be one of the most studied games in economic strategy due 
to its application to reality and its implications for cooperation. Despite the inherent 
alignment between the game and marital relationships, very little research has been 
conducted on married partners in a PD game.  We wanted to observe the extent to which 
behavior in a PD game predicted marital satisfaction.  Participants were recruited from a 
church couple’s group in Abilene, Texas (n = 40). Results of this preliminary research 
indicate that a couple’s competitiveness in the PD game has a positive relationship to 
marital satisfaction. The length of an individual’s marriage and how often individuals 
cooperate with one another are negatively correlated with an individual’s marital 
satisfaction. Results further indicate that a respondent’s likelihood to forgive his partner 
for defection had no relationship to their marital satisfaction. We provide some possible 
reasons for these divergent findings. This study adds to current research on game theory 
and current research on marital satisfaction and relationships, while filling a gap in the 
current research on these topics. 
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Marriage Games: A Game Theory Exploration of Marital Relationships 
Literature Review 
Over the past few decades, game theory has gone from a rarely used tool for 
economic analysis to one of the most used economic theories. It is inherently 
interdisciplinary in nature and has implications for various fields of research. According 
to Crawford, “game theory has fulfilled a large part of its promise, giving systematic, 
illuminating analyses of many central questions. Indeed, game theory has also begun to 
unify the rest of the social sciences, transforming parts of political science, computer 
science, and evolutionary biology” (2016).  Game theory attempts to explain complex 
human interactions with other humans in mathematical terms that can be documented and 
analyzed. In Game theory, the goal is to find equilibrium:  a point at which all players 
(given the information they have) will continue to use the same strategy over and over 
without change. The purpose here is to maximize payoffs. There are multiple types of 
interactions that game theory explores. There are simultaneous games, where players 
both make decisions at the same time and are unaware of what the other player is 
choosing. These games explore how people interact with one another with no knowledge 
of what decision the other player is choosing. Other games are sequential, where players 
must make decisions in order. For example, chess is a sequential game, where one player 
makes a move, and the other interacts after seeing what move the first player makes 
(Brams et al., 2017). 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 Consider the specific game used in this study: the prisoners’ dilemma (PD). 
Creaded by Merril Flood and Melvin Dresher and then further developed by Albert 
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Tucker, the prisoners’ dilemma is a simultaneous game that explores how two players 
interact with one another (Dixit & Barry, 2017).  Each player has two options: defect or 
cooperate. An individual’s payoff is determined by the interaction between the two 
player’s choices. For example, Table 1a. below shows the payoffs from a hypothetical PD 
game matrix. The payoff for player A for any given interaction is on the right and the 
payoff for player B is on the left. According to this matrix, if both players choose to 
cooperate then they each will receive a score of 11 and if both choose to defect then both 
will receive a score of 8.  However, if player A cooperates whereas player B chooses to 
defect then Player A will receive a score of 0 and player B will receive a score of 20. The 
payoffs are reversed if their behaviors are reversed. If player A defects whereas player B 
chooses to cooperate then Player A will receive a score of 20 and player B will receive a 
score of 0. 
Table 1a. 
 
 It is always a dominate strategy to defect in a single round PD game. This is 
because regardless of the other player’s decision, one can always receive a higher payoff 
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by choosing to defect rather than cooperate. Consider the payoffs from table 1 again. If 
player A cooperates, then player B will receive either a score of 11 (cooperate) or 20 
(defect). If player A defects, then player B will receive either a score of 0 (cooperate) or 8 
(defect). When both players are acting economically in a single round PD game, both will 
choose to defect and both would receive a payoff of 8.  
 However, when multiple rounds of the game are played, players potentially have a 
better option. When both players defect, they each receive a score of 8. However, when 
both players decide to cooperate, they could each receive a score of 11. According to 
Crawford, when the game is played with multiple rounds, and players are properly 
motivated by future payoffs, the decision for both players to cooperate becomes 
“consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium. For example, both players could follow 
the “grim trigger” strategy “Cooperate until the other player Defects, then Defect 
forever,” which happens to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and yields the outcome 
{Cooperate, Cooperate} in every period” (Crawford, 2016). Therefore if the game is 
played for an unknown amount of rounds, it is possible that they could cooperate every 
round.  
 However, the decision to either cooperate or defect is not that cut and dry, as 
humans are rarely ever purely economical and rational beings. Research has found that 
there are many other factors that might affect an individual’s likelihood to cooperate or 
defect. Becker et al (2012) found that the big 5 personality traits (extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness and neuroticism) all seem to affect the way a 
person decides to act in economic situations where there is a potential payoff. Kagle and 
McGee (2014) attempted to predict an individual’s likelihood to cooperate in early 
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rounds of a PD game by using these personality traits. They found that agreeableness had 
a strong positive relationship towards early round cooperation. This suggest that there are 
certain motives other than maximizing payoffs that affect the way people play the PD 
game.  
Further research indicates that there are some universal factors affecting how 
individuals choose to play the PD game. Rather than players fully understanding the most 
economical way to approach the PD game from the start, research finds that players 
experiment throughout early rounds to determine the best possible strategy (Fudenberg et. 
al., 2016).  Their results indicate that players rarely held grudges against one another 
when the opposing player defected. Rather than punishing the defective player, the 
participant would “forgive” the defection, allowing for both players to eventually 
cooperate with one another and maximize their payoffs (ibid).  
Further research from Fudenberg in 2014 attempted to predict cooperation in a PD 
game using various demographic information and a person’s altruistic tendencies. 
However, they found that “none of the commonly observed strategies are better explained 
by inequity aversion or efficiency concerns than money maximization,” which implies 
that in repeated games, cooperation is motivated more by payoffs than various social 
factors. Players sought to maximize their payoff above everything else. Cooperation 
seems to be directly tied to personal benefit, that is: we seem to be most likely to 
cooperate when it benefits us. So while players might be willing to forgive another player 
after one or several defections, the authors contend that “leniency and forgiveness seem 
to be motivated by strategic concerns rather than social preferences” (2014). 
Marriage and the Game 
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Previous research seems to focus completely on how two strangers decide to play 
the PD game, and the research suggests that strangers focus on individual payoffs and 
disregard how their decision might affect the opposing person. However, the same might 
not be true for individuals who live in close social context with one another. These types 
of players will have much more intimate knowledge of one another, which might affect 
how they play.  
The bond of marriage might be one of most intimate types of social contexts 
apparent today. Research shows that couples must make intimate and difficult decisions 
daily. These decisions can determine whether their marriage will be successful or not 
(Lavner, et. al, 2014). Essentially, couples must decide daily how they are going to 
interact with one another. Much like the prisoners’ dilemma, in marriages, couples 
choose to either defect, or cooperate with one another. Kalifian and Barry further find 
that couples learn how to navigate marital problems, and the inability to successfully 
cope and address these issues results in marital stress and potential marital transgressions 
(2016). 
It seems as though the way a couple interacts in the PD game might map well 
onto how the interact with one another throughout marriage. For example, a spouse 
decides whether or not they will assist with chores around the house (cleaning, washing 
dishes, food preparation, etc.) and choosing to not cooperate with their spouse on these 
issues could easily be seen as defection by their spouse. Despite this inherent alignment 
between the game and marital relationships, very little research has been conducted on 
married partners in a PD game. 
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It seems that one’s marital satisfaction could be predicted by their interactions 
with their spouse in a PD game. Married couples who play the PD game can either 
choose to work together to maximize their collective payoff, or they could choose to 
defect and attempt to maximize their own payoff. Based on the previous research 
discussed, it seems that couples with high rates of defection would be less satisfied with 
their marriage.  
Research Question 
This research attempts to predict a person’s martial satisfaction based on the 
interactions with their spouse in the PD game. Previous research indicated that age, 
gender, and education all can be used to predict marital satisfaction. Specifically, Jose 
and Alfons found that “Men tend to show higher levels of marital satisfaction compared 
with women,” and that “highly educated women had higher rates of unstable marriages” 
(Jose & Alfons 2007). Even when controlling for these demographics, we hoped to see an 
effect on marital satisfaction from the PD game. 
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Methodology 
Participants were recruited from a local church group in Abilene, Texas (n=40). 
This specific church group was designed for couples who wished to improve their 
marriage, and as much, a majority of our participants had expressed difficulties in their 
marriage. Data was collected over the course of several Wednesdays between the dates of 
January 18, 2017 and March 22, 2017. On any given week of data collection there would 
be 4 to 12 participants.  
First, participants took a marital satisfaction survey using 30 questions from the 
Couples Satistfaction Index (Funk  & Rogge, 2007). They then provided additional 
demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, and length of marriage. Questions 
were on a scale from 1 to 6 and we used their average score as their individual marital 
satisfaction score. Question’s addressed issues regarding relationship strength, desire to 
continue in the relationship and how well a person’s needs were met by their spouse. See 
appendix 1 for the complete survey.  
Self-report tests are, at best, noisy estimates of some true, underlying variable.  To 
the extent that they are reliable estimates of an underlying variable, in this case, marital 
satisfaction, it is possible that a principal components analysis could help elucidate the 
signal from the noise.  We ran a principle components analysis on individual’s responses 
to the survey. The first principle component explained approximately 65% of the 
variance in the dataset. We used this first principle component as their marital satisfaction 
score- the dependent variable in our analysis. 
Second, individuals participated in a minimum of 20 rounds of the prisoners’ 
dilemma game against their spouse. We used z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox, a computer 
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software program to run the PD game (Fischbacher, 2007). Individuals were given an 
instruction sheet and had these instructions read to them before the game occurred. See 
appendix 2 for the complete instruction sheet. Due to constraints in location, couples 
played the game in the same room as one another, but on different sides of the room so 
that they were unable to see each other’s computer screen. Payoffs per round are 
described in table 1b. below. Individuals received a payoff for participating in this study 
in the form of a restaurant gift card based on their preferences indicated on the survey. 
We used a random round from the PD game to determine the amount of money received 
on the gift card. For example, if the random round chosen was round 5, and a player 
recievd a score of 11 on round 5, their payoff would be an $11 gift card. In this way, 
individuals were encouraged to maximize their payoff on every round.  
Table 1b.  
 
We added a 1/8th probability of “error,” in our PD game, following similar 
methods as Fudenberg, Rand and Dreber in their 2012 study.  For example, on any given 
round one, or both player’s choice to either cooperate or defect could be changed to the 
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opposite decision, at a probability of 1/8.  If an “error” occurred, neither the one who sent 
it nor the one who received it would be aware that this was not the intended play. The 
player who sent the error would receive the payout as if their actual decision was made, 
whereas the individual who received the error would receive the payout in accordance to 
the error.  This “communication error” properly mimics actual marital interactions, where 
an individual is not always completely aware of his or her spouse’s true intentions.   
After the 20th round of the PD game, the game had a 20% chance of another round 
occurring in keeping with Fudenberg et. al. (2012). Crawford suggests that when the PD 
game is played for a specific and known number of rounds, “that players’ preferences are 
defined by the addition of players’ payoffs across plays of the game… The unique 
equilibrium then entails both players choosing Defect in every period” (Crawford, 2016). 
In other words, it would be in both player’s best self-interest to defect every round if 
there is a specified number of rounds.  
By creating a modified PD game with both error and a chance of continuance 
after round 20, we can properly “test what happens when subjects play an infinitely 
repeated prisoners’ dilemma with error” (Fudenberg, 2012). This method is reliable to 
both reduce the chance that an individual will keep to one strategy throughout the game, 
and properly mimics the reality of married life- where length of time is not predetermined 
and knowledge is not absolute.  
We trimmed the first 5 responses of the PD game off the dataset in order to reduce 
the noise from individuals learning how to properly play the game in early rounds 
(Fudengberg, 2012). For each respondent, we had a minimum of 15 rounds of decision 
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making in the PD game, along with the decisions made by their spouse, the interaction 
between those decisions, and their specific demographic information.  
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Results 
Demographics 
As previously stated, there was a total of 40 participants. Each respondent 
provided their ethnicity, age, gender, years married and education level.  Due to our 
location in Abilene, Texas the overwhelming majority of respondents reported their 
ethnicity as White (n= 37). Because of this, ethnicity was excluded from the analysis.  
Age 
Table 2 shows the breakdown of participants by age. All of the respondents fell 
between the age 21 and 65, with the all but 7 respondents falling under the age of 40. To 
determine the effect of age on a person’s marital satisfaction score, we divided our 
respondents into three age bins: 21 to 30, 31 to 36, and 37 to 65 (See Table 2 below for 
details). Chart 1 depicts the average marital satisfaction score of each age bin. Those in 
the age group 31 to 36 had the highest marital satisfaction with an average score of 5.31 
and those youngest and oldest categories had the lowest marital satisfaction scores with 
4.35 and 4.22 respectfully. Of particular interest was whether age was related to a 
person’s marital satisfaction. We tested this by running a single factor ANOVA 
comparing a person’s marital satisfaction score to their age bin, the results of which was 
significant. A post hoc analysis shows that there is a statistically significant difference in 
the average score between those in the age category 31 to 36 and the rest of the 
respondents (p =.0093).  
Table 2 
 
Age Bins Avg. Score N
21-30 4.34579 14
31-36 5.30519 12
37-65 4.22073 14
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Chart 1  
 
We then tested to see if a person’s age had any effect on their probability of 
cooperating in the PD game. A person’s probability of cooperation is defined as their 
average rate of cooperation over all rounds of the PD game. Chart 2 shows each person’s 
probability of cooperating with their spouse on any given round. As respondents age 
increased, their rate of defection rose and thus older individuals had a lower probability 
of cooperation. In order to determine if there is a relationship between a person’s age and 
their probability of cooperation, we ran a single factor ANOVA comparing a person’s 
probability of cooperation to their age bin, the results of which were insignificant (p = 
.15). We saw no relationship between a person’s age and their probability of cooperation 
in the PD game.  
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Chart 2 
 
Gender 
We tested to see if gender had any effect on marital satisfaction or a person’s 
probability of cooperation. Chart 3 shows that on a scale from 1 to 6, men had slightly 
higher reported marital satisfaction scores. Chart 4 shows that there was almost no 
difference between men and women’s likelihood to cooperate with one another. We 
wished to see if there was a relationship between a person’s gender and either their 
marital satisfaction or their probability of cooperation. To test this, we ran two 1-tailed t-
tests assuming unequal variance comparing gender to these variables and the results of 
both were insignificant (p = .15, .35). We found that gender had no effect on either 
marital satisfaction or probability of cooperation. 
0.60
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0.45
0.00
0.20
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Average Probability of Cooperation by 
Age
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Chart 3         Chart 4 
 
Years married 
We binned respondent’s number of years married into three categories as depicted 
in Table 3. Twenty-seven participants had been married less than nine years. Charts 5 and 
6 show that those who had been married longer reported lower marital satisfaction scores 
while also reporting lower levels of cooperation. We wished to see if length of marriage 
was related to a person’s marital satisfaction score or their probability of cooperation. To 
test this, we ran two single factor ANOVAs comparing a person’s length of marriage bin 
to their marital satisfaction score and their probability of cooperation, the results of which 
were insignificant (p = .642, .698). We saw no relationship between a respondent’s 
number of years married and either their marital satisfaction or their probability of 
cooperation. 
Table 3 
 
Years Married Bins Average Score N
1 to 4 4.796 14
5 to 9 4.510 13
9 or More 4.447 13
0.49 0.47
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
Male Female
Average Probability of 
Cooperation by Gender
4.78 4.43
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
Male Female
Average Marital Satisfaction 
by Gender
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Chart 5           Chart 6 
 
Education Level 
Respondents reported their education level by six different categories: less that 
high school, high school equivalency, some college but no degree, associate’s degree, 
bachelor’s degree, and graduate or professional degree. We combined these six categories 
into three distinct categories: those with a high school education or less, those with some 
college, and those with a bachelor’s degree or higher. See table 4 for more details.  
Table 4 
 
Chart 6 and 7 show that those with a mid-range education level report the lowest marital 
satisfaction while also having the highest level of cooperation. Of particular interest was 
if there was a relationship between a person’s education level and either their marital 
satisfaction or their probability of cooperation. To test this, we ran two single factor 
ANOVAs comparing respondent’s education level bin to both their marital satisfaction 
score and their probability of cooperating, the results of which were insignificant (p = 
Education Bins N Marital Satisfaction
High School or Less 7 4.905
Some Colelge 14 4.223
Bachelors or More 19 4.744
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1 to 4 5 to 8 9 or more
Average Marital Satisfaction 
per Years Married
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.231, .621). We saw no relationship between a respondent’s level of education and either 
their marital satisfaction or their probability of cooperation. 
Chart 6 
Chart 7 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 
 The goal of this research is to see if any factors from the PD game could be used 
to predict a person’s marital satisfaction score. We first ran a best subset multiple linear 
regression (MLR) using nine different variables. This method of MLR finds the best 
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combination of some or all of the independent variables to predict the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable we used was the first principle component of each person’s 
answers to the survey.  
Several of our independent variables had to be modified before we could use them 
in the MLR analysis. MLR assumes that the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable is linear. However, several of our independent 
variables had non-linear relationship to marital satisfaction. In order to mitigate this, we 
used the logarithm of both years married and age, as these two variables seemed to have a 
non-linear relationship to marital satisfaction. We used both a person’s self-reported 
education level (on a scale from 1 to 6) and their education level squared, as this variable 
too had a non-linear relationship to a participant’s marital satisfaction- in a seemingly 
bell-curve shape. Gender was also included in this original model.  
 We included 4 variables from the PD game. We chose a person’ probability to 
cooperate, their partner’s probability to cooperate, an interaction variable between these 
two probabilities, and a person’s relative level of cooperation given their partner defected 
on the last round. This final variable – relative level of cooperation given their partner 
defected last round- is a forgiveness variable. It measures how likely an individual is to 
forgive their spouse for not cooperating the round before. By trimming the first 5 rounds 
of the PD game (see Methods for details) we ensured that we were seeing genuine 
forgiveness rather that participants learning how to play the game in early rounds. In our 
model, we expected to see that these variables from the PD game would have a positive 
relationship to marital satisfaction.  
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 The MLR best-subset produced a four-variable model, with each variable having 
statistical significance. Using this model, a person’s marital satisfaction can be described 
using the following formula: 
PCA(Marital Satisfaction) = -3.56 -.96(YearsMarried) + 2.22(Education) -
.26(Education^2)  -1.69(InteractionProbability) 
A persons’ number of years married had a negative relationship to their marital 
satisfaction (p = .05). High levels of education had a positive relationship to marital 
satisfaction (p = .018). However, after a point, a very high level of education begins to 
have a negative relationship to marital satisfaction as seen in the negative coefficient of  
education squared (p= .035).  
 
Only one variable from the PD game appeared in this best-subset model: the 
interaction variable between a couple’s probability of cooperation (p= .035). 
Contradictory to what we expected, a couple’s group cooperation actually lowered their 
marital satisfaction. Also surprising, a person’s likelihood to forgive their spouse for 
defection was not in the model, as it was a poor predictor of marital satisfaction. 
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Discussion & Recommendations 
Due to the obvious limitations of a small sample size and similar demographic 
information of all respondents, this research is not generalizable to either Abilene, or 
married couples in general. Rather, this research is intended to provide preliminary 
information about how the PD game can be used to predict marital satisfaction.  
Results from the MLR model seem to contradict the current research on how 
people play the PD game. The fact that the participants were recruited from a marital self-
help group might explain this. For example, a couple that is recent married might desire 
to attend such a group even if they report high marital satisfaction whereas a couples that 
has been married for many years might only attend such a group if they are experiencing 
major problems in their marriage. 
We found that there was no relationship between a person’s likelihood to forgive 
their spouse for defection and marital satisfaction. Perhaps individuals who are quick to 
forgive their spouse, while likely to be happy at first, end up facing a more defective 
partner in the long run. If a person is not “punished” for defection, they could be more 
likely to continue to defect. This result seems to agree with the research of McNulty and 
Fincham who contend that “forgiveness may not always be so beneficial…Rather, 
forgiveness is a process that can be either beneficial or harmful, depending on 
characteristics of the relationship in which it occurs (McNulty & Fincham, 2012). 
 Perhaps most interesting is that the interaction between a couple’s probability of 
cooperation actually predicted lower levels of marital satisfaction. We suggest that this 
has to do with playfulness. In other words, couples that have no competitiveness between 
one another, and therefore cooperate continuously, do not feel the same kind of passion 
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and joy in their relationship as couple’s that compete with one another do. In research 
from Driver and Gottman they found that a couple’s playfulness was correlated to their 
ability to resolve conflict. Specifically, they found “that the husband’s playful bids in 
daily life seem to have an important role for both conflict and everyday interactions. His 
ability to initiate playfulness was strongly related to both the wife’s playfulness and her 
own enthusiasm. His playfulness was also related to the couple’s ability to access humor 
during conflict” (2004). It therefore makes sense that couples who are able to play well 
against one another would have a higher marital satisfaction.  
 Another point of interest is the apparent decline in marital satisfaction for those 
who have been married for over nine years and are over 37 years of age. We believe that 
this might have something to do with children. Previous research posits that children can 
have a major effect on individual happiness, particularly in the mother (Taraban et. al. 
2017). Those who have been married over nine years and in this age bracket are at an age 
where, if they have children, their children are beginning to start school, which could be 
stress inducing for the family. Future research should examine the role of children in 
marital satisfaction. 
 As we move forward in this study, we hope to have a larger and more diverse 
sample size, as this was our greatest limitation. However, as preliminary research to a 
much larger project, this research proves to be extremely beneficial. We see that there 
seems to be some relationship between how couples interact in the PD game and their 
self-reported marital satisfaction. Currently, game theory has not been used to map 
marital satisfaction, but could perhaps be a helpful tool for couples, therapists and social 
scientists in future research.  
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Appendix 
Wick et al. Marriage Survey: (data was collected through online survey format through Google Drive) 
Taken from Funk, J. L. & Rogge, R. D. (2007). Testing the ruler with item response theory: 
Increasing precision of measurement for relationship satisfaction with the Couples Satisfaction 
Index. Journal of Family Psychology, 21, 572-583. 
 
Questions about your marriage relationship: 
 
1. Please indicate the degree of happiness, all things considered, of your 
relationship. 
 
Extremely 
Unhappy 
Fairly 
Unhappy 
A Little 
Unhappy 
Happy Very 
Happy 
Extremely 
Happy 
Perfect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most people have disagreements in their relationships. Please indicate below the 
approximate extent of agreement or disagreement between you and your partner for each 
item on the following list. 
 
Always 
Agree 
Almost 
Always 
Agree 
Occasionally 
Disagree 
Frequently 
Disagree 
Almost 
Always 
Disagree 
Always 
Disagree 
2. Amount of 
time spent 
together 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Making major 
decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
Demonstrations 
of affection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
All 
the 
Time 
Most 
of 
the 
Time 
More 
Often 
than Not 
Occasionally Rarely Never 
5. In general, how 
often do you 
think that things 
between you and 
your partner are going 
well? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. How often do you 
wish you 
hadn’t gotten into this 
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relationship? 
  
Not at 
all 
True 
A 
little 
True 
Somewhat 
True 
Mostly 
True 
Almost 
Completely 
True 
Completely 
True 
7. I still feel a strong 
connection 
with my partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. If I had my life to live 
over, I 
would marry (or live 
with/date) the same 
person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Our relationship is 
strong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. I sometimes wonder 
if there is someone else 
out there for me 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. My relationship with 
my 
partner makes me happy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. I have a warm and 
comfortable relationship 
with my partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. I can’t imagine 
ending my 
relationship with my 
partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. I feel that I can 
confide in my 
partner about virtually 
anything 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. I have had second 
thoughts 
about this relationship 
recently 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. For me, my partner is 
the 
perfect romantic partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. I really feel like part 
of a team with my 
partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. I cannot imagine 
another 
person making me as 
happy as my partner does 
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Not at 
All 
A 
Little 
Some-
what 
Mostly Almost 
completely 
Completely 
19. How rewarding is 
your 
relationship with your 
partner? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. How well does your 
partner 
meet your needs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. In general, how 
satisfied are 
you with your 
relationship? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Worse than 
all 
others 
(extremely 
bad) 
    
Better than all 
others 
(extremelygood) 
23. How good is your 
relationship compared to 
most? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Never Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Once 
or 
twice a 
month 
Once 
or 
twice 
a 
week 
Once a 
day 
More 
Often 
24. Do you enjoy your 
partner’s 
company? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. How often do you 
and your 
partner have fun 
together? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each of the following items, select the answer that best describes how you feel about 
your relationship. Base your responses on your first impressions and immediate feelings 
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about the item.
 
Additional Questions not from Funk and Rogge (2007): 
33. How many years have you been married? (Please round to the nearest whole number.) 
____________ 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
34. We have 
experienced major 
problems in our 
marriage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you agree that you have experienced major problems in your marriage, please indicate which 
of the following you have experienced (check all that apply): 
__ Separation 
__ Death of a child 
__ Financial problems 
__ Health problems 
__ Children with special needs  
__ Marital infidelity 
__ Pornography 
__ Other: _________________________________ 
 
Demographic Information: 
 
Gender:    Male      Female 
 
Age: 
 
Age of spouse: 
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Ethnicity:  White      Hispanic or Latino     Black or African American 
(select one) 
Native American or American Indian Asian / Pacific Islander 
 
Other 
 
Education: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?  
___ Less than high school 
___ High school graduate (includes equivalency) 
___ Some college, no degree 
___ Associate's degree 
___ Bachelor's degree 
___ Graduate or professional degree 
 
Restaurant Preferences: 
On a scale of -5 (greatly dislike) to 5 (greatly enjoy), please rate your preference for the 
following restaurants –  
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Jason’s Deli 
           
Buffalo Wild Wings 
           
Hickory Street Cafe 
           
Golden Corral 
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Appendix 2- Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Instructions (page 1/2) 
Instructions: 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to 
ask us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed during the experiment.  
 
This experiment is about decision making. You will be matched with your spouse in another 
room. You will be able to earn a restaurant gift card (to be delivered next week) based on 
your preferences and the decisions you and your spouse make in the experiment.  
 
The Session:  
The session is divided into a series of interactions between you and your spouse in the other 
room.  
 
In each interaction, you play a random number of rounds. In each round, you and your spouse 
can choose one of two options.  
 
In each round of the experiment, the same two possible options are available to both of you: 
A or B.  
 
Your round-total income for each possible action by you and the other player is described in 
the table below.  Your payoff is listed first and is in bold and your spouse’s payoff is listed 
second. 
   
Your Spouse’s Choice   
A B 
Your Choice A 11, 11 0, 20 
B 20, 0 8, 8 
For example:  
If you play A and the other person plays A, you would both get 11 units.  
If you play A and the other person plays B, you would get 0 units, and they would get 20 
units.  
If you play B and the other person plays A, you would get 20 units, and they would get 0 
units.  
If you play B and the other person plays B, you would both get 8 units.  
 
Your income for each round will be calculated and presented to you on your computer 
screen. 
You must enter your choice within 30 seconds or a random choice will be made for you. 
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Appendix 2- Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Instructions (page 2/2) 
 
A chance that your choice is flipped: 
 
There is a large probability that the move you choose actually occurs. But with a small 
probability, your move will be flipped to the opposite of what you chose. That is:  
 
 When you choose A, there is a large chance that you will actually play A, and small 
chance that instead you play B. The same is true for the other player.  
 When you choose B, there is a large chance that you will actually play B, and small 
chance that instead you play A. The same is true for the other player.  
 
When a choice flip or error occurs, the person sending the error will not know that their 
choice has been switched. For example, if the wife chooses A and with the small probability 
it is flipped to B, her husband will receive the payoff as if she chose B but she will receive 
the payoff associated with her true choice of A.  The husband will not be informed that B was 
not her original choice.  
 
Number of Rounds:  
 
You will play at least 20 rounds of this decision experiment with your spouse. After the 20th 
round, there is an 80% probability of another round, and 20% probability that the interaction 
will end. Successive rounds will occur with probability 80% each time, until the interaction 
ends (with probability 20% after each round). 
 
Summary  
 
To summarize, every interaction you have with your spouse in the experiment includes 20 
rounds with a random number of rounds added thereafter. Your behavior has no effect on the 
number of rounds or the number of interactions.  
 
There is a small probability that the option (A or B) you choose will be flipped and the 
opposite option occurs instead, and the same is true for your spouse. If your choice is 
switched, you will not know and your payoff will not be affected.  If your choice is switched, 
your spouse will be told which move actually occurred, but they will not know what move 
you actually chose.  
 
 
